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THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING PRIVATE: JUDICIAL
INTERVENTION INTO DISMISSAL POLICIES OF
PRIVATE COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES
In the third quarter of the twentieth century state and federal courts
increasingly have been called upon to examine disputes arising from the
relations between universities and stbdents.1 A significant portion of the
litigation requires judicial resolution of issues posed by student dismissals
from these institutions of higher learning. Student dismissals from tax-
supported state colleges and universities must comply with the due process
and equal protection strictures of the fourteenth amendment, or parallel
state constitutional provisions.2 The extent to which the judiciary can
intervene into the campus affairs of private colleges and universities re-
mains unclear.
Private university students litigating dismissals most often challenge
university actions on a constitutional basis. The legal theories on which
student claims are based, and the manner in which they are evaluated,
vary according to whether a dismissal has been for disciplinary 3 or aca-
The increase in university-student litigation in the past twenty-five years can be traced
to several sources. Primarily, increased enrollment and expansion in the number of available
colleges and universities has given rise to a larger volume of student grievances. In addition,
increased social awareness of university students has focused on controversial issues in Ameri-
can life, such as U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, social injustice, and minority admis-
sions. The frequent demonstrations serving as forums for articulating student opinion on
these issues have resulted in a large number of disciplinary dismissals and suspensions. See
generally Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 987, 987-88 (W.D. Wis. 1968); Wright, The
Constitution and the Campus, 22 VAND. L. Rxv. 1027, 1032-33 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Wright].
With the Fifth Circuit's decision in Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d
150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1962), it was clear that a public university
dismissing a student for disciplinary reasons must afford that student his procedural due
process rights. Dixon involved the expulsion of black students from the state university for
their participation in a non-violent demonstration in the local courthouse. These students
were not told of the specific charges against them, nor were they given an opportunity to state
their case. The court held that the students had been denied due process by the university
action. Id. at 158; cf. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) successfully
invoked by student plaintiffs in suit involving ten day suspension from high school). See also
Winnick v. Manning, 460 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1972); Brown v. Strickler, 422 F.2d 1000 (6th Cir.
1970); Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 965 (1969). In the public university context, the debate does not involve questions of
state action, but rather what procedures must be followed by a university so as to comply
with due process. See note 72 infra.
3 For cases involving disciplinary dismissals, see Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ., 514
F.2d 622 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 898 (1975) (student dismissed for using faculty
member's name on article submitted for publication without consent); Grossner v. Trustees
of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (dismissals for participation in student
protest activity involving occupation of university facilities); Ryan v. Hofstra Univ., 324
N.Y.S.2d 924 (S. Ct. 1971) (student dismissed for destruction of university property in rock-
throwing incident). See generally Note, The Scope of University Discipline, 35 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 486 (1969); Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1045, 1134-
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demic' reasons. Students dismissed from private colleges and universities
for disciplinary reasons usually assert a violation of their fourteenth
amendment right to notice and a hearing,' while students dismissed for
alleged academic deficiencies claim infringement of substantive and proce-
dural due process rights because the university has acted arbitrarily, capri-
ciously, or in bad faith.' Student plaintiffs also, however, have argued that
contract law should be applied to university dismissal action in view of the
accepted notion that the university-student relationship is contractual in
nature.7
Disciplinary dismissals engender most of the student claims in current
42 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law]; Comment, Private Government
on the Campus-Judicial Review of University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362 (1963).
4 For cases highlighting issues raised by academic dismissals, see Grafton v. Brooklyn
Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973); McDonald v. Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 375 F. Supp.
95 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd 503 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1974); Balogun v. Cornell Univ., 70 Misc. 2d 474,
333 N.Y.S.2d 838 (Sup. Ct. 1971). See text accompanying notes 71-81 infra. See generally
Dessen, Student Due Process Rights in Academic Dismissals From the Public Schools, 5 J.
LAw & EDUC. 277 (1976); Note, Due Process and the University Student: The Academic-
Disciplinary Dichotomy, 37 LA. L. Rav. 939 (1977).
5Whether procedural due process applies in the private university context depends on
whether the university activity can be characterized as "state action." See, e.g., Barrios v.
Inter Am. Univ., 535 F.2d 1330 (1st Cir. 1976); Robinson v. Davis, 447 F.2d 753 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 979 (1971); Belk v. Chancellor of Wash. Univ., 363 F. Supp. 45 (E.D.
Mo. 1970); see text accompanying notes 8-56 infra.
6 See, e.g., Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975); Connelly v. University of Vt.
State Agricultural College, 244 F. Supp. 156 (D. Vt. 1965); Sofair v. State Univ. of N.Y.
Upstate Medical Center College of Medicine, 54 A.2d 287, 388 N.Y.S.2d 453 (S. Ct. 1976).
' See, e.g., Basch v. George Wash. Univ., 370 A.2d 1364 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (university
contractually bound to terms printed in catalogue); DeMarco v. University of Health Sci-
ences/Univ. of Chicago Medical School, 40 Ill. App. 3d 474, 352 N.E.2d 356 (App. Ct. 1976)
(terms stated in catalogue relating to degree creates contract). See generally, Note, Contract
Law and the Student-University Relationship, 48 IND. L.J. 253 (1972); Developments in the
Law, supra note 3, at 1144-47.
Several legal theories which appear in court decisions supplement student arguments
based on constitutional or contract theories. For example, students have urged that the
university-student relationship is a fiduciary one, and thus should be governed by trust
theory. Under this view, students assert that the university has a fiduciary obligation based
on "confidence," and requires the university to act in "good faith" toward its students. See
People ex rel. Tinkoff v. Northwestern Univ., 33 Ill. App. 224, 77 N.E.2d 345, 349-50 (App.
Ct.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 839 (1947); Koblitz v. Western Reserve Univ., 11 Ohio Dec. 515
(1901). This theory would render irrelevant the current constitutional distinction between
public and private schools drawn by courts in evaluating student claims, but has not been
widely argued in university-student litigation. See Goldman, The University and the Liberty
of its Students-A Fiduciary Theory, 54 Ky. L.J. 643 (1966).
Courts have also applied an in loco parentis theory to university-student relations.
Briefly stated, that theory posits that the university stands in the place of the parents as
regards the mental training and physical and moral welfare of students, and may regulate
student conduct towards these ends without judicial review unless unlawful or in violation of
public policy. See Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204, 206 (1933). University
regulation of student conduct under this theory has fallen into disfavor primarily because
universities regulate student conduct which has never been the subject of the parent-child
relationship, and further, off-campus housing and increasing numbers of married students
similarly obstruct judicial application of this theory. See Comment, Colleges and Universi-
ties: The Demise of in loco parentis, 6 LAD & WATR L. REV. 715, 719-39 (1971).
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private university-student litigation. Whether constitutional claims are
brought in a federal' or state forum,' the aggrieved student must, as a
jurisdictional prerequisite, demonstrate that his claim arises from depriva-
tion, under color of state law, of a right or privilege guaranteed by the
Constitution. Restated, the student must be able to show that the univer-
sity action constitutes "state action."'" A finding of state action is essen-
tial, for the fourteenth amendment secures individual rights and liberties
from infringement by public, governmental entities and does not apply to
wrongs committed between private parties." Therefore, characterization of
the acts of a university as state action will subject nominally private acts
to the constitutional restraints imposed on governmental activity.1 2 De-
spite a variety of theories on which state action has been asserted, however,
student plaintiffs continue to encounter difficulty in successfully urging
that state action has occurred.
Student plaintiffs usually assert three theories under which university
action might be characterized as state action: public function, 13 state en-
8 Students litigating their constitutional claims in federal court must satisfy the state
action requirement in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the statutory right of action under which student
claims are brought. This section provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proceeding
for redress.
Id. The jurisdictional requirements of the statutes are contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), which
provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by
law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or im-
munity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act
of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or all persons within
the jurisdiction of the United States.
Id.
Since the fourteenth amendment applies only to state activity, students in state courts
must also satisfy that amendment's state action requirement. U.S. CONsT., amend. X1V; see,
e.g., Kwiatkowski v. Ithaca College, 82 Misc. 2d 43, 368 N.Y.S.2d 973 (Sup. Ct. 1975); Ryan
v. Hofstra Univ., 67 Misc. 2d 651, 324 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
10 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrruToNAL LAw 1147 (1978) [hereinafter cited as AMERCAN
CONSTITU NAL LAW]; J. NoWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw 451 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as CONsTrrutnONAL LAW].
,t CONSTITIoNAL LAW, supra note 10, at 451-52. The reach of the fourteenth amendment
was set forth in Mr. Justice Bradley's opinion in The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883):
"It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individ-
ual rights is not the subject matter of the amendment." Id. at 11. See generally Burke &
Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditor's Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth
Amendment, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 1003, 1012-15 (1973) [hereinafter cited as An Essay on the
Fourteenth Amendment].
22 CONSTrrUTONAL LAw, supra note 10, at 451-52.
, See text accompanying notes 16-27 infra.
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couragement,' 4 and state entwinement. 5 Under the public function argu-
ment, activities normally associated with and performed by governmental
entities will be subject to constitutional restraints when performed by a
private party. This theory was first articulated in Marsh v. Alabama,"
where the Supreme Court held that the managers of a privately owned
town operated by Gulf Shipbuilding Company could not prohibit distribu-
tion of religious pamphlets on "town" property.'7 In concluding that the
company town was the functional equivalent of a municipality, the major-
ity stressed that the town provided services such as street maintenance,
housing, and recreational facilities normally provided by a local governing
municipality. Thus, the acts of the town managers constituted state action
for purposes of the fourteenth amendment.'"
Similarly, student plaintiffs argue that the current operation of private
universities and their increasing importance in relieving burdens imposed
on state facilities available for higher education results in the education
of a large number of students who, but for private universities, would have
to be educated by the state or receive no education at all." Students argue
that this situation indicates that private colleges and universities perform
a public function."' The courts have consistently rejected this argument,
" See text accompanying notes 28-45 infra.
"5 See text accompanying notes 46-51 infra.
" 376 U.S. 501 (1946).
Id. at 509.
" Id. at 507. For a recent illustration of the public function theory, see Illinois Migrant
Council v. Campbell Soup Co., 438 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Ill. 1977). The court in Illinois Migrant
Council concluded that an agricultural community owned and operated by a private corpora-
tion that provided housing for Campbell employees was "the functional equivalent of a
municipality." Id. at 226. In a "company town," the community organized by a private entity
on private property provides services to residents normally performed by the local governing
municipality, and therefore performs a "public function." Id. Defendant company's refusal
to allow members of the Migrant Council to speak with town residents, in derogation of
plaintiff's first amendment rights, therefore constituted state action. Id. at 227. See also
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); Amalgamated Food Employees Local 509 v. Logan
Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945).
," The distinction between private and public colleges and universities can be traced to
the Supreme Court's decision in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 518 (1819). In a suit involving the power of the New Hampshire legislature to alter
the charter of Dartmouth College without its consent, Chief Justice Marshall distinguished
Dartmouth College, "a private eleemosynary institution" from a "civil institution to be
employed in the administration of government." Id. at 640-41. As a result of Dartmouth's
private character the state legislature could not alter its character by amending its charter.
At that time, higher education was an exclusively private activity, so that educational institu-
tions did not "fill the place, which would otherwise be occupied by government, but that
which would otherwise be vacant." Id. at 647. This observation undercuts the strength of the
public function theory in that higher education cannot historically be regarded as an activity
normally exclusively performed by the state. See H. FRIENDLY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE
AND THE PUBLIC-PRIvATE PENUMBRA (1968); O'Neill, Private Universities and Public Law, 19
BUFFALO L. REV. 155, 156-57 (1969).
Pendrell v. Chatham College, 370 F. Supp. 494, 497 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Belk v. Chancel-
lor of Wash. Univ., 336 F. Supp. 45, 48 (E.D. Mo. 1970); Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane
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stating that mere private operation of an activity in which the state also
engages is insufficient to characterize private education as a public func-
tion.' A contrary position, courts continue, would impermissibly require
the judiciary to determine whether a private activity constitutes a public
function on the basis of the importance of the activity rather than its
relation to traditional state functions.Y On this ground the Second Circuit
firmly refused to sustain the public function contention urged by student
plaintiffs in Powe v. Miles.2 Four of the seven students in Powe attended
Alfred University, a private school, while the remaining plaintiffs attended
the New York Ceramics College, a state supported institution connected
with Alfred University. 24 The students were suspended for participating in
a demonstration against an ROTC ceremony conducted on University
grounds. In spite of the fact that students enrolled at the ceramics school
were enrolled in liberal arts courses at Alfred, that ceramics courses were
available to Alfred students, and that all students were expelled for the
same conduct, the court held that constitutional protection extended only
to the students suspended from the state ceramics school.2 Noting the
absence of a "state monopoly" on higher education, the court concluded
that higher education was not an activity normally associated with or
performed by the state. Therefore, Alfred University, disciplining its own
students, did not have to comply with fourteenth amendment requisites.',
Although the result reached in Powe seems arbitrary and artificial, the
decision accords with the public function cases decided by the Supreme
Court!'
Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855, 859 (E.D. La.), rev'd 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962); cf. Stewart v.
New York Univ., 430 F. Supp. 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (plaintiff's suit involving denial of
admission, not dismissal from the University).
21 Stewart v. New York Univ., 430 F. Supp. 1305, 1312 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Pendrell v.
Chatham College, 370 F. Supp. 494, 497 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Belk v. Chancellor of Wash. Univ.,
336 F. Supp. 45, 48 (E.D. Mo. 1970).
U CONsrrrtrnoNAL LAw, supra note 10, at 456. "Public function" determinations must be
made on the character of activity performed by the private party, not on its relative import-
ance. See e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1975) (operation of a public
utility not a public function).
23 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
21 Id. at 77-78. The New York State Ceramics College was a "contract or statutory"
college under the New York State Education law. N.Y. Enuc. LAw §§ 350(3) & 352(3)
(McKinney 1948). Under this law, many of the affairs of the Ceramics College were, in fact,
handled by the administration of Alfred University acting as the representative of the state
university trustees. See N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 6102 (McKinney 1947).
21 407 F.2d at 83-84. The Second Circuit ruled that the university action concerning the
students enrolled at the Ceramics School did constitute state action. Id. at 82. The Powe court
based this conclusion on New York Education Law § 6102 (McKinney 1947) which granted
Alfred University the right to control disciplinary matters at the Ceramics College as repre-
sentative of the state trustees. Id. at 83.
1' Id. at 80.
27 See text accompanying notes 16-18 supra. Commentators have recently argued that
"public function" cases reaching the Supreme Court have been decided on very narrow
grounds, making the public function theory ineffective in future university-student litigation.
An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 11, at 1051-73. Apart from Marsh v.
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A second theory asserted as a basis for finding state action is state
encouragement of activity conducted by private individuals. This theory
differs fundamentally from "public function" since it focuses on the
"nexus" between the state and the particular acts of the private wrong-
doer, rather than on the similarity between state and private functions.2
The Supreme Court articulated the "nexus" test for state action in
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. 9 The petitioner in Jackson alleged she
had been deprived of rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment
when utility service to her home was terminated without notice or hearing.
In rejecting the petitioner's argument that state regulation of the utility
company, and the state-granted monopoly held by the utility0 indicated
state encouragement of the specific acts of the company, the majority
wrote that "the inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus
between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that
the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself."'31
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), the public function cases decided by the Court involved racial
discrimination. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461
(1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). Thus, it is arguable that the state action
doctrine will be liberally applied only in fourteenth amendment discrimination cases. An
Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 11, at 1012. In fact, commentators have
persuasively argued that the public function cases are best understood on other grounds.
Compare id. at 1066-68 (arguing that the public function cases demonstrate the fourteenth
amendment cannot be circumvented by the state labeling an activity private) with AMmcAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 10, at 1163-67 (public function cases demonstrate it is
impermissible for state to passively allow discrimination at the hands of private parties).
s CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 10, at 460. The "state encouragement" theory com-
pels the court to perform a bifurcated analysis. Initially, the court must determine whether
the State is involved in the challenged activity. If so, the court then must decide whether
the involvement is significant enough to characterize otherwise private activity as acts of the
State. If both of these conditions are met, then constitutional restraints will be imposed. See
Note, State Action: Theories For Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity,
74 COLUM. L. Rav. 656, 660-62 (1974). In Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1966), the leading
state encouragement case, the Supreme Court concluded that a California law prohibiting
the state or a state agency from interfering in the right of any person to sell, lease or rent
property to a person of the seller's choice sufficiently involved the state in private activity to
trigger constitutional protections. Id. at 381. The Court affirmed the decision of the California
Supreme Court holding the law unconstitutional because it encouraged private parties to
discriminate against racial minorities, and in effect, recognized a private right to discrimi-
nate. Id. at 373. See also Schubert, State Action and the Private University, 24 RUrGEs L.
REv. 323, 347 (1970); Shelley v. Kraemer, 337 U.S. 1 (1948) (judicial enforcement of a racially
restrictive covenant sufficient state involvement to constitute state action). Liberal applica-
tion of the state action doctrine in racial discrimination cases, discussed in note 27 supra,
suggests that the current vitality of Reitman is in doubt.
419 U.S. 345 (1974).
Id. at 351-52.
' Id. at 351. See also Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (granting of liquor
license by state regulatory authority to private club discriminating against blacks insufficient
state involvement for fourteenth amendment requirements).
Moose Lodge and Jackson indicate the willingness of the Court to allow the states pri-
mary responsibility for controlling private activity without unduly subjecting all private
activity regulated or encouraged by the state to constitutional restraints. See An Essay on
the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 11, at 1091-96; Comment, State Action After Jackson
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Absent a showing of a close nexus by a plaintiff, a court cannot find state
action.
Under this theory, state legislative acts might serve as state encourage-
ment or sanction of private university activity. Such state encouragement
may come in the form of a state-granted charter," conferral of eminent
domain power, 33 or promulgation of tax-exempt status of a private univer-
sity,3 In Powe for example, the Second Circuit hypothesized that if New
York State had passed a statute pertaining to control of student demon-
strations, the Alfred University students might have been accorded consti-
tutional protection, for the University's disciplinary action would then
have had the direct sanction of the state.
3
1
In Isaacs v. Board of Trustees of Temple University3 a federal district
court determined that a Pennsylvania statute altering the private status
of Temple University constituted sufficient state involvement for four-
teenth amendment purposes. In an effort to satisfy increasing demand for
higher education by state residents, while limiting education costs, the
legislature appropriated funds for Temple to expand and improve its exist-
ing facilities.37 In addition to yearly direct financial aid, the statute pro-
vided for appointment of state officials as Board of Trustees members,
3
state participation in university budgeting,39 submission of annual reports
to the legislature,"0 and state involvement in determining faculty course
loads and salaries." On the basis of such extensive state regulation the
court clearly was justified in finding state action, for the legislation had
transformed a private institution into a "state instrumentality." 2
Most private university students 'aggrieved by university disciplinary
action, however, would be unlikely to encounter similar statutes on which
v. Metropolitan Edison Co.: Analytical Framework for a Restrictive Doctrine, 81 DicoNSON
L. REv. 315, 326-28 (1977); Note, State Action and The Burger Court, 60 VA. L. Rav. 840,
849-51 (1974).
" See, e.g., Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 524 F.2d 818, 825 (7th Cir. 1976);
Pendrell v. Chatham College, 370 F. Supp. 494, 499 (W.D. Pa. 1974); N.Y. EDuc. LAW §§ 5701
-09 (McKinney 1947) (incorporating Cornell University); see Note, An Overview: The Pri-
vate University and Due Process, 1970 DUKE L.J. 795, 798-99.
33 See Keller & Meskill, Student Rights and Due Process, 3 J. LAw & EDUc. 389, 395
(1974).
3 See Berrios v. Inter Am. Univ., 535 F.2d 1330, 1332 (1st Cir. 1976); Blackburn v. Fisk
Univ., 443 F.2d 121, 123 (6th Cir. 1971); Lorentzen v. Boston College, 440 F. Supp. 464, 465
(D. Mass. 1977). See generally O'Neill, Private Universities and Public Law, 19 BuFFALo L.
Rav. 155, 183 (1969); Comment, Private Government on the Campus-Judicial Review of
University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362, 1381-82 (1963).
3 407 F.2d at 81.
11 385 F. Supp. 473 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
31 PA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 24, § 2510-1 et seq. (Purdon 1965).
3- PA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 24, § 2510-4 (Purdon 1965).
11 PA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 24, § 2510-8 (Purdon 1965).
11 PA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 24, § 2510-8, 10 (Purdon 1965).
1' PA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 24, § 2510-10 (Purdon 1965).
42 385 F. Supp. at 477. Significantly, the Pennsylvania legislature passed a statutory
provision changing the name of Temple University to "Temple University-Of the Common-
wealth System Of Higher Education." PA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 24, § 2510-3 (Purdon 1965).
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to structure a compelling state action argument. In Coleman v. Wagner
College,43 for example, a New York state law" requiring all colleges to file
regulations pertaining to student conduct with the commissioner of educa-
tion was held insufficient state involvement in the actual disciplinary con-
trol requirement of the fourteenth amendment.45
Finally, state entwinement with the acts of private individuals may
satisfy the state action requirement. In the paradigm state entwinement
case, the private party and the state can be regarded as joint partners or
participants in the challenged activity. The Supreme Court examined such
an arrangement in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,4" where a
privately owned restaurant that discriminated against blacks leased space
in a parking facility owned and operated by a state entity. In examining
the contacts between the state entity and the restaurant, the Court wrote
that nonobvious involvement of the state in private conduct could best be
determined by "sifting facts and weighing circumstances." In Burton, the
parking authority had agreed to provide free utility services and perform
structural repairs, as well as confer certain tax exemptions enjoyed by the
parking authority." In concluding this arrangement established a
"symbiotic relationship" between the state and the private party, the
Court stated that when government and private activities become so in-
tertwined for their mutual benefit, the private party has no basis for com-
plaint when his decisions are subject to constitutional limitations in the
same manner as those of the government.49
429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970).
, N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 6450 (McKinney 1969). In addition to the provisions pertaining to
filing with the commissioner of education, § 6450(1) dictates that the trustees or similar
governing boards of every college chartered by the regents or incorporated by the legislature
must adopt regulations toward maintaining order on campus, including enforcement and
penalty provision. Id.
11 429 F.2d at 1124. In Coleman, a student asserted that he had been denied his due
process rights when he was dismissed for disciplinary reasons without notice of the charges
against him or an opportunity to present his story. Id. at 1123. The student asserted that his
dismissal constituted state action since the university disciplinary rules were required by
state law to be filed with the education commissioner. Id.; see note 41 supra. Although
agreeing that the filing requirement indicated a degree of state involvement in the discipli-
nary area, the Second Circuit held that the student had still failed to demonstrate that the
college regulation had actually been approved by the state. Further, the court held that N.Y.
EDuc. LAW § 6450 (McKinney 1969) merely prescribed a filing procedure, and did not call
for or authorize state evaluation of the regulations submitted. 429 F.2d at 1125.
365 U.S. 715 (1961).
'? Id. at 723.
Id. at 718-20.
, Id. at 725-26. See also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966). In Evans, a testator
bequeathed a park to a municipality with the proviso that the park was to be available to
whites only. The town, however, turned the park over to a group of private trustees. The
Supreme Court found that the city still maintained responsibility for park maintenance and
upkeep, and this mutual benefit relationship formed a sufficient basis for concluding that the
action of private trustees amounted to state action. Id. at 301. For a critical discussion of the
analysis employed by the Court in Evans, see An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, supra
note 11, at 1067; see note 27 supra.
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Students have asserted under the entwinement theory that government
aid to a private college or university results in sufficient state connection
with the university to trigger fourteenth amendment safeguards. Courts
evaluating such claims usually examine the precise extent of the state's
financial contribution, and- further, whether the alleged wrong can be at-
tributed in some way to the state aid." For state action to have occurred
in such a situation, the state would have had to subsidize an activity that
contravened a student's constitutional rights." Courts have seldom
reached such a conclusion.
Judicial analysis of state action arguments asserted by student plain-
tiffs follows the case-by-case evaluation evident in the state action cases
In a recent case in the faculty dismissal context the Third Circuit employed a Burton
analysis in determining that state action had occurred. Braden v. University of Pittsburgh,
552 F.2d 948 (3d Cir. 1977). The legislation discussed in Braden, the "University of Pitts-
burgh-Commonwealth Act" PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2510-201 et seq. (Purdon 1966), was
expressly intended to provide funds to an existing private university to expand its facilities
to provide room for state residents seeking higher education. 552 F.2d at 959. The legislation
provided for extensive state appropriations, § 2510-207; capital improvements, § 2510-208;
and the state appointment of school trustees, §§ 2510-204 to 205.
The Braden court distinguished the nexus test from the symbiotic relationship test,
indicating that a symbiotic relationship might occur whenever both the state and the private
entity benefit from the activity. 552 F.2d at 957-58; see Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345, 351 (1975); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
Therefore, the symbiotic relationship test may cover a broader range of university activities,
since the nexus test requires that a state must in some way be positively involved in an
activity before the activity can be deemed state action. 552 F.2d at 957-58; see 419 U.S. at
251. Consequently, students arguing that a state and university both received benefits from
a challenged activity might persuade a court that the activity is state action more easily than
if they argued state action under a nexus theory.
As yet, the distinction has not been adopted by other courts, and seems unsupported by
further examination of Jackson. The state regulatory agency in Jackson and the private
utility company carried on a relationship from which each possibly benefitted. In particular,
Mr. Justice Marshall stressed that the private utility company possessed a state-granted
monopoly and engaged in a cooperative pattern of conduct with the state. 419 U.S. at 366.
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Thus, a finding that Jackson did not involve a "symbiotic rela-
tionship" seems questionable.
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1976) (claim arising from
rejection of plaintiffs application for admission); Stewart v. New York Univ., 430 F. Supp.
1305 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). See generally Keller & Meskill, Student Rights and Due Process, 3 J. LAw & EDuc.
389, 395 (1974); Hendrickson, 'State A ction' and Private Higher Education, 2 J. LAw & EDuc.
53, 71 (1973); Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. Ray. 1003, 1102-09 (1960).
1, See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (state subsidized constitutionally imper-
missible activity). A unanimous Court in Norwood held that state disbursement of textbooks
to public and private schools, without regard to the racially discriminatory practices of some
of the private schools, constituted direct financial assistance to institutions practicing dis-
crimination. Id. at 463-64. The Court concluded that the state could not constitutionally
provide these schools with financial aid. Id. at 466.
As with the above discussed state action theories, however, courts have not been recep-
tive to claimants seeking to demonstrate state action through reliance on the existence of
government aid. See Berrios v. Inter Am. Univ., 535 F.2d 1330, 1332 (1st Cir. 1976); Cohen
v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 524 F.2d 818, 825 (7th Cir. 1975); Greene v. Howard Univ.,
412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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decided by the Supreme Court."2 In recent state action decisions by the
Court,5 3 however, the institutional values served by the fourteenth amend-
ment state action limitation have been accorded greater deference. Such
institutional values include protection of the individual from arbitrary
government action, preservation of federalism by limiting the role of the
national government, promotion and facilitation of the structuring of pri-
vate relationships, and separation of powers.54 This trend, combined with
the coextensive development of increasing congressional activity in the
civil liberties area5 suggests a current reluctance to subject private activity
to constitutional restraints, even in the face of significant state contacts.-
Thus, the near uniform rejection of state action arguments asserted by
students against private universities indicates a judicial resolve unlikely
to be altered by future student litigation asserting state action arguments.
Although state action is the fundamental prerequisite for student ac-
tions in federal and state court,57 students alleging constitutional depriva-
tions for disciplinary dismissals in a federal forum must satisfy additional
statutory requirements. In asserting a claim under section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act of 186658 student plaintiffs may only sue "persons" acting under
color of state law." The statutory language regarding who may be sued
follows from the eleventh amendment prohibition of suits in which the
State is the defendant."5 In the public university context federal courts are
inclined to permit suits in which the university, its administrators, or
Board of Trustees have been named as defendant." These cases indicate
52 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Burton v. Wilmington Park-
ing Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); See Note, State Action and the Burger Court, 60 VA. L.
REv. 840, 841 (1974).
' See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Lloyd Corp., Ltd.
v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972); Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
' An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 11 at 1012-18.
Id. at 1018-29 (stressing use of Congress's power under section five of the fourteenth
amendment).
5 Note, State Action and the Burger Court, 60 VA. L. REv. 840, 841 (1974).
57 See notes 8-9 supra.
- 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
' See note 8 supra for the specific provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
The eleventh amendment provides that "The judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend in any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by citizens of another state or by citizens or subjects of any foreign
state." U.S. CONST., amend. xi.
11 See Gay Students Organization v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974). In rejecting
the defendant university president's assertion that he was not a "person" as contemplated
by § 1983, the Bonner court wrote that it could not "accept the conclusion that § 1983,
directed specifically and exclusively at misconduct carried out under the color of state law,
is not available to challenge the action of persons who are acting in their capacity as state
officials." Id. at 655. Thus, as long as students name university officials as defendants, actions
probably will be maintainable under § 1983. Id; accord Siebbing v. Weaver, 396 F. Supp. 104,
108 (W.D. Wis. 1975); Wolfe v. O'Neill, 336 F. Supp. 1255, 1258 (D. Alaska 1972). Contra
Prostrollo v. Univ. of S.D., 507 F.2d 775, 777 n.1 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 952 (1975);
Schare v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Stony Brook, 437 F. Supp. 969, 970 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
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that only if the state itself is the "real party in interest" will the plain-
tiff's action be barred by the eleventh amendment. 2 Otherwise, a determi-
nation that a student is alleging wrongful acts by individual administrators
in their official capacities will satisfy the section 1983 requirement that a
"person" must have deprived the claimant of a constitutionailly protected
right under color of state law. 3
Finally, a student in either state or federal court must allege that the
dismissal has deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity guaranteed
by the Constitution. In the disciplinary context this involves liberty or
property interests. The student plaintiffs in Powe for example, alleged they
had been deprived of first amendment rights without due process of law."4
Several recent Supreme Court decisions however, indicate that liberty and
property interests will be defined narrowly. The Supreme Court in Board
of Regents v. Roth 5 held that the decision not to rehire a non-tenured
faculty member did not constitute deprivation of a liberty interest without
due process. The plaintiff in Roth argued that the failure to rehire him
had damaged his good name, reputation, honor, and integrity, and there-
fore limited his future employment possibilities."8 The Court concluded
that Roth was not entitled to a hearing and a specification of reasons for
his non-retention since he had not been denied a liberty interest. Roth
had failed to show that the decision not to rehire him had foreclosed em-
ployment opportunities."8 Similarly, a student dismissed from private uni-
versity might argue that he was stigmatized by university action, and
therefore deprived of "liberty", since job and educational opportunities
had been thereby impaired. 9 Roth, however, indicates that students must
establish directly that future opportunities have been foreclosed by univer-
sity action to prove a deprivation of liberty has occurred. 0
02 See Gordenstein v. University of Del., 381 F. Supp. 718, 720 (D. Del. 1974).
3 See note 63 supra.
" 407 F.2d at 79.




" See Greenhill v. Bailey, 419 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975). The Eighth Circuit in Greenhill
held that the university administrations actions in making a written notation questioning the
dismissed student's intellectual ability on his transcript without giving him an opportunity
to be heard amounted to a deprivation of liberty. Id. at 9. The court concluded that the
student was entitled to a hearing in which he should be given an opportunity to refute the
claims against him. Id. at 10. See also Jansen v. Emory Univ., 440 F. Supp. 1060, 1061-62
(N.D. Ga. 1977) (dental student at private university dismissed for academic reasons and
subsequently rejected for admission to dental schools in United States, Canada, and Puerto
Rico).
10 See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). The Supreme Court in Paul held that damage
to petitioner's reputation by action of the local police chief was an insufficient deprivation of
liberty and did not trigger due process protection. Id. at 706. The police chief in Paul had
distributed photos of alleged shoplifters, including one of petitioner, to local merchants in
an effort to curb shoplifting. Petitioner's job with his current employer was jeopardized
thereby, although he was not fired. The Court rejected petitioner's claim that this police
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Academic dismissals from colleges and universities account for only a
small portion of the litigation created by the private university-student
relationship. State and federal courts have consistently stated that a uni-
versity's academic evaluation of a particular student is entitled to great
deference, and maintained that the judiciary should not intrude in a uni-
versity's presumed area of competence.7' As a result, students seeking re-
dress for academic dismissals are unsuccessful if seeking judicial review of
a specific grade. Instead, the student must demonstrate that his work has
been evaluated in an arbitrary manner, in violation of his fourteenth
amendment rights.7 2 As previously discussed in the disciplinary dismissal
context, however, wrongs cognizable under the fourteenth amendment
must have resulted from state action. The task of demonstrating state
action in academic dismissal cases has proven no less difficult than in the
disciplinary dismissal area.
In Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School73 the students asserted that a grant
of state funds pursuant to New York State law and a grant of state land
action deprived him of a liberty interest in that stores would be inhibited from allowing him
into their establishments. Id. at 697.
Unsuccessful allegations of deprivations of liberty interests would not preclude students
from asserting that their dismissals have deprived them of a property interest. To argue that
he has been deprived of a property interest a student would have to demonstrate he has a
property interest in continuing his education on the basis that faithful attendance, combined
with tuition, creates a property interest in college education. Such an argument has been
favorably received in the public school context. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975); cf.
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345-57 (1976) (local ordinance prescribing procedure for dis-
missal of municipal employees does not create property interest in continuing employment).
7, See Keys v. Sawyer, 353 F. Supp. 936, 939 (S.D. Tex. 1973), aff'd, 496 F.2d 876 (1976)
("courts should not interfere or substitute their judgment and authority for that of local and
state school authorities unless such action is clearly warranted to protect rights guaranteed
by the Constitution"); Note, Due Process and the University Student: The Academic-
Disciplinary Dichotomy, 37 LA. L. Rlv. 939, 946-47 (1977).
2 The "arbitrary, capricious, or bad faith" standard was first articulated in the univer-
sity context in Connelly v. University of Vt. State Agricultural College, 244 F. Supp. 156 (D.
Vt. 1965), where the court stressed that university officials are the best judges of academic
performance, and thus courts should be reluctant to intervene in such matters. Id. at 160-61;
see Jansen v. Emory Univ., 440 F. Supp. 1060, 1063 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Abbario v. Hamline
Univ. School of Law, 258 N.W.2d 109, 112 (Minn. 1977). In Board of Curators of Univ. of
Mo. v. Horowitz, 98 S. Ct. 948 (1978), a student was dismissed from a public medical school
for academic reasons, allegedly in violation of her procedural due process rights. The aca-
demic violation in Horowitz concerned clinical deficiencies, an important portion of the
Medical School curriculum. After a special evaluation procedure was designed and followed
by the faculty to reassess Horowitz's clinical aptitude, the dismissal was again approved. Id.
at 951. The Court assumed without deciding that Horowitz had been denied a liberty or
property interest, and concluded that the procedure by which she was evaluated fully met
fourteenth amendment requirements. Id. at 952. Moreover, the majority noted that, unlike
the vast majority of other students academically dismissed, Horowitz was given a hearing
which the law did not require. Id. at 953-54. As noted by the Court in Horowitz, academic
dismissals do not normally entitle a student to a hearing because it is believed that a hearing
is not well adapted to determine academic competence, being unlike the fact-finding function
served by hearings in the disciplinary context. Id; see, e.g., Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d
448, 450 (5th Cir. 1976); Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 848 (10th Cir. 1973).
73 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973).
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for university purposes indicated state involvement satisfying the state
action requirement. 7 In addition, the academically dismissed students in
Grafton asserted that a New York State law requiring passage of written
examinations as a prerequisite to eligibility for the Bar was sufficient state
involvement for fourteenth amendment purposes. For constitutional pur-
poses, however, the Court held that distributing and grading examinations
in satisfaction of Bar examination prerequisites did not establish state
involvement in the plaintiff's dismissal, nor did the state aid constitute
state action.
75
Courts have proved more receptive to student plaintiffs alleging that
their dismissal on academic grounds constitutes a breach of the university-
student contract. According to contract theory, the provisions of the stu-
dent catalogue relating to academic standards of performance form the
terms of a contract with the university upon receipt of the student's tui-
tion.78 Suing on contract, a student does not need to prove state action in
1' Id. at 1142.
15 Id. The Grafton court determined that state scholastics requirements, as well as finan-
cial aid in the amount of $400 per student, were insufficient state contacts to satisfy the state
action requirement for section 1983 purposes. 478 F.2d at 1141; see Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d
73 (2d Cir. 1968).
11 See Jansen v. Emory Univ., 440 F. Supp. 1060, 1062-63 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Giles v.
Howard Univ., 428 F. Supp. 603, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Sofair v. State Univ. of N.Y. Upstate
Medical Center College of Medicine, 54 A.D.2d 287,388 N.Y.S.2d 453,455-56 (Sup. Ct. 1976);
Note, Judicial Review of the University-Student Relationship; Expulsion and Governance,
26 S AN. L. REv. 95, 104-06 (1973).
Students have sued public and private colleges alleging breach of contract concerning a
variety of matters involved in academic life. See Basch v. George Washington Univ., 370 A.2d
1364, 1366-67 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (alleging university should be bound by provision in catalogue
relating to projected tuition increases); Zumbrun v. University of S. Cal., 25 Cal. App. 3d 1,
101 Cal. Rptr. 499, 504 (Ct. App. 1972) (seeking to hold university for breach of term in
catalogue relating to scope and duration of course instruction); Steinberg v. Chicago Medical
School, 41 Ill. App. 2d 804, 354 N.E.2d 586, 589-90 (App. Ct. 1976) (acceptance of student's
application accompanied by fee creates contract with university to evaluate application ac-
cording to term stated in university catalogue).
While contractual attacks on student dismissals remain available to those attending
public colleges and universities, these students may also invoke additional constitutional
arguments not available to students at private institutions because of judicial refusal to find
state action. Students may argue that their dismissals should be nullified because college
regulations are vague or overbroad. See Sill v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 318 F. Supp. 608
(N.D. Pa. 1970): Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 963 (1970); Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978 (N.D. Wis. 1968), affl'd,
418 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1969). Under the "void for vagueness" doctrine, when the government
seeks by the imposition of sanctions to impose restraints on individual freedom, it must avoid
use of language which is so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application. Note, Bringing the Vagueness Doctrine on
Campus, 80 YALE L.J. 1261, 1269 (1971). "Overbreadth," on the other hand, generally refers
to a regulation which threatens constitutionally protected liberties, such as the inhibition of
first amendment rights such as free speech, press, religion, and peaceable assembly. Com-
ment, Vagueness and Overbreadth in University Regulations, 2 TExAs TECH L. REv. 255, 256-
57 (1971). Reported decisions involving attacks on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth
indicate that students rarely prevail in such litigation. Compare Esteban v. Central Mo. State
College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969) (regulations withstand attack) with Solglin v. Kauff-
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order for the court to have jurisdictional requirements, and student plain-
tiffs may focus on the substantive claim that their evaluation violated
catalogue provisions pertaining to academic standards. In Lyons v. Salve
Regina College," a nursing student sought to have a grade of "F" changed
to "Incomplete" by a procedure set forth in the catalogue. The procedures
clearly allowed such student requests, channeling them to a faculty com-
mittee which then made a recommendation to the dean. In Lyons the dean
overruled the faculty committee's decision to change the grade, and the
student asserted that the refusal to accept this recommendation consti-
tuted breach of contract." The court held that the catalogue provision did
not bind the dean to accept the committee's recommendation and reversed
the grant of relief afforded by the district court. "
Although commentators and courts agree that the university-student
relationship is contractual in nature, full application of contract princi-
ples, primarily designed for the commercial marketplace, seems foreign to
college campuses. Thus, one difficulty with the contract theory concerns
interpretation of the terms of the university-student agreement. Courts
must decide whether the university-student contract is an "integrated
agreement" to be interpreted in light of the circumstances surrounding its
formation, or, if not an integrated agreement, to apply the "reasonable
expectations of the parties" standard in construing the contract. The
court in Lyons, for example, found that in the absence of an integrated
agreement there was no reasonable expectation that "recommend" would
be interpreted by a reasonable person to mean "bound"."'
These are interpretive problems common in the commercial market-
place, but it is open to question whether students' expectations will be easy
to determine, making unclear the extent to which contract law should be
applied by the courts. Whether courts will apply additional contract prin-
ciples such as unconscionability, overreaching, modification of contract
terms, and measurement of damages must be resolved by future litigation.
Nevertheless, contract theory commends itself to both court and student.
Resolution of university-student disputes by focusing on the intent of the
parties and de-emphasis on state action prevents the judiciary from dis-
honoring the institutional values of the fourteenth amendment through
expansion of constitutional coverage of private activity. 2 Further, focus on
man, 295 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis. 1968), aff'd 418 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1969) (regulations found
vague). See generally Note, Bringing the Vagueness Doctrine on Campus, 80 YALE L.J. 1261
(1971).
"7 565 F.2d 200 (1st Cir. 1977).
7' Id. at 201.
7, Id. at 202.
° See Giles v. Howard Univ., 428 F. Supp. 603, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1977); J. CALAMAM & J.
PEMLLO, CoNTRAcTs § 47 (1970).
" 565 F.2d at 202.
,2 See text accompanying notes 8-56 supra. Behind the judicial posture not to expand
the state action doctrine lies the fear that private activity will increasingly be subject to
constitutional restraints. See Dixon v. Alabama St. Bd. of Education, 294 F.2d 150, 160
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the interpretation of the intent of the parties facilitates limited yet careful
review of the broad discretion exercised daily by private university officials
in the conduct of university-student affairs.
JoHN F. SHEEHAN
(Cameron, C.J., dissenting) (judicial intervention into school affairs requires courts to act as
"Gargantuan aggregation of wet nurses and baby sitters").
To date, students dismissed from private colleges and universities have not been success-
ful in urging judicial adoption of the state action doctrine, so that dismissal action by private
colleges and universities remains outside the scope of constitutional protection. If, however,
this trend is reversed, examination of public university dismissal procedures reveals the
specific constitutional protections likely to be afforded. It is generally recognized that the
student dismissed is entitled to the following procedural safeguards: notice, with grounds for
dismissal specified; a hearing, though not necessarily a full judicial proceeding, but one
containing the "rudiments of an adversary proceeding." Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of
Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158-59 (5th Cir. 1961); Woody v. Burns, 188 So. 2d 56, 58 (Fla. 1966).
See also General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of
Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Learning, 45 F.R.D. 133, 147 (8th Cir.
1968). Because the due process rights which accrue to an individual vary according to particu-
lar fact situations, courts disagree whether students possess rights to cross-examine witnesses,
and whether students may be presented by retained counsel. See Wright, supra note 1,
at 1072-80; Note, Due Process and the University Student: The Academic-Disciplinary
Dichotomy, 37 LA. L. Rzv. 939, 943-47 (1977).
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